ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) consists of many tiny sensor nodes having very limited amount of storage, insufficient battery power, low computational power. They are scattered randomly or deterministically over a large target area. These sensors communicate between each other via radio frquency waves. These nodes gather sensitive information and they have widespread application in several civil and military purposes. These purposes include military surveilance, ocean-water monitoring, wild fire detection, temperature monitoring etc. to name a few. Since these sensors deal with very sensitive information, they must communicate securely so that no adversary can get hold of the information sent by them. To achieve this, cryptographic primitives have to be used for communication between sensors. Inevitably, this gives rise to usage of cryptographic keys.
way using protocols like Kerberos [13] is expensive for sensor networks, which are resource constrained. The other method using public keys is being explored [5, 9] but not preferred because of costly operations involved. Key predistribution (kpd) is a method to preload cryptographic keys in sensor nodes, even before their deployment in the area of operation. It is a symmetric key approach, where two communicating nodes share a common secret key. The sender encrypts the message using the secret key and the receiver decrypts using the same key. Several key predistribution schemes that can be found in [3, [6] [7] [8] 4, 11] In this paper we propose a connectivity model based on Reed Muller Codes that we use to enhance the security of two existing key predistribution scheme proposed by Lee Stinson scheme [6] [7] [8] . This combination of the two schemes give rise to a secure communication model for Wireless sensor networks.
COMMUNICATION MODEL
Here, we shall be using two communication models proposed by Lee The authors mapped the same design to key predistribution scheme in Wireless sensor networks. Their key predistribution schemes are described below.
Design 1
The details of the first design proposed by Lee Stionson can be found in [7, 8] . A brief outline is presented here.
Let p be a prime number and k be an integer such that p k ≤ ≤ 2 .
There are 2 p number of nodes in the network. These nodes are given by: 
are the groups of the design.
are the block where all operations are done under modulo p . Now , if each variety is mapped to a unique key and each block made to correspond to a node, then this will give rise to a key predistribution scheme. This is the key predistribution scheme of Lee Stinson. Here the set of keys is given by:
The keys belonging to node 
Design 2
The second chosen kpd scheme was proposed in details by Lee Stionson in [6, 8] . Briefly recalling:
Again let p be a prime number and k be an integer such that
There are 3 p number of nodes in the network. These nodes are given by
are the block where all operations are done under modulo p . Now, if each variety is mapped to a unique key and each block made to correspond to a node, then this will give rise to a key predistribution scheme. This is the st 1 key predistribution scheme of Lee and Stinson. Here the set of keys is given by:
The keys belonging to node: Here we want to remark that both Design 1 and Design 2 generalizes to any finite field q F by replacing p by any prime power q in the above argument.
WEAKNESS: MOTIVATION OF OUR WORK
We observe a weakness in the aforesaid key predistribution scheme. Here the node ids reveal the points inside a particular node. Let us say node 
. Now, the adversary can find the id of a node (say To counter this problem, we first differentiate the two aspects communication and connectivity of a WSN. Then like in [12] , apply Reed Muller Codes to suitably model the connectivity aspect. The construction of the model is presented the in following section. The model can be made secure by using suitable cryptosystems.
As shall be later established the combination of the two ideas results in a highly resilient key predistribution scheme for WSN providing same connectivity amongst nodes as the initial models with virtually same communication overhead.
PROPOSED CONNECTIVITY MODEL
As stated above, Reed Muller codes will be utilized to structure the connectivity aspect of the WSN. These codes have been elaborately described in [2] and necessary notational changes have been highlighted by Sarkar et al. in [12, section IV] . We follow similar procedure as described in [12, section IV] baring some modification to be illustrated now.
Both the models will always have three tiers with the ``Base Station'' or ``KDS'' in the st 1 or topmost tier. The second tier will consist of p & 2 p newly introduced cluster heads (CHs) for the first and second designs respectively. Each of these CHs will be assigned p many nodes in the rd 3 tier in both the designs. CHs (meant for `Design 2') are presented in the following matrix below:
Matrices like the above one are used for construction of Reed Muller codes. In particular the first matrix (meant for `Design 1') has been referred to as (1;3) R in [2] . Here 1 means the degree of the monomials is `1' and 3 stands for the number of variables. The significance of the entries 1 and 0 in the first matrix ( (1;3) R ) is the presence and absence of a connectivity link at that row and column position respectively. Thus for connectivity of two any entities (KDS or CHs or ordinary nodes), both of them should have a 1 in the same column for at least one column. Each column is assigned a separate connectivity key immaterial of them using the same radio frequency channel. 
DEPLOYMENT
There can be various methods for node deployment. We discuss one of them here as an example. At the time of deployment, we shall drop the CHs along with the nodes of its cluster. Clearly instead of totally random deployment, we are deploying in small groups where exact position of nodes may still be unknown. Thus we adopt a kind of pseudo-random deployment technique. This ensures that all the clusters are formed according to the model. However in an unlikely event of some nodes falling out of position, we adopt the following key re-scheduling technique.
Assume some node of one cluster A falls into another cluster B. In such a case, CH of cluster B broadcasts the node id or I.P. address of the misplaced node amongst all the CHs to find out the actual cluster where it should have been placed. On seeing the I.P. address or node id of this node, the CHs respond whether or not the misplaced node belongs to their cluster. Since this node was supposed to be in cluster A, its CH is the only who responds with 'YES'. Using the secure link between CH of cluster A and cluster B, the connectivity key corresponding to this sensor and CH of cluster A is transmitted to the CH of cluster B. This key is used to set up a secure connectivity link between the CH of cluster B and the misplaced. Depending on the requirements and practical hazards, CH of cluster B decides on the exact connectivity for this misplaced node in its cluster. Clearly a redistribution of connectivity keys may be required. In case this is not possible, still the node remains connected to the network but all communication will involve CH of B. It is clear that in this scenario, there is a process of node addition in cluster B and node deletion at cluster A. These processes have been described in [12] We would like to remark that instead of interconnectivity (clique connectivity) of sensor at the base level, one may desire to have just the connection with the CHs. This will enable better security, make (connectivity) key distribution easier and also reduce the importance of simple nodes at the bottommost level. In such a case the nd 2 tier CHs may have to be powerful to ensure security.
COMMUNICATION KEY ESTABLISHMENT
We now describe how one can utilize the secure connectivity model for communication key establishment. As mentioned earlier node ids can be used for this purpose.
Any node encrypts its node id ܰ , using the con. key that it shares with its CH and sends the encrypted node id to its CH. On receiving these encrypted ids, the CHs decrypts them and circulates them securely amongst themselves using the connectivity keys of one another (at CH level). For each incoming encrypted node ids, the CHs immediately decrypts them to get the unencrypted node ids. The node ids are then equated to find the common key ids of the corresponding node. Once the common key ids are obtained, they are immediately informed back to the node via the same secure channels between CHs and node.
Clearly when the nodes send their ids we utilize the connectivity model of last two tiers. Whereas when the node ids are being circulated at the CH level, we use the connectivity keys Thus instead of the nodes, CHs get to know other nodes' id and equating the resulting linear equations. Then the nodes are securely informed about the common key by the CHs. Hence any attack on the resultant system during key establishment would require capture of some CH or somehow read the encrypted node ids. Considering both capturing CH or decrypting the encrypted node is high unlikely during key establishment, we are ensured of extremely secure key establishment of the resultant system.
RESILIENCY ENHANCEMENT: HASH FUNCTIONS
In this section an unique technique is presented which make the overall communication more secure. This method is particularly useful when one key of the WSN is shared by more than one nodes. In this work based on Lee & Stinson's [7, 6, 8] key predistribution schemes. In Design 1 2.1 based on the scheme in [7] each key is shared between p nodes. On the other hand in Design 2 2.2 based on the scheme in [7] each key is shared between 2 p nodes. The method suggested here will work fine for Design 1 and hence we describe it in detail for Design 1 here. However for Design 2 storage may become a factor as shall be shortly explained.
Observe that by distinguishing communication from connectivity of a WSN, then applying a suitable cryptosystem to the connectivity model, one manages to convert the node identifier a secret or private information for each node. This information is known only to the concerned node at all times and to the CHs at the time of key establishment.
During key establishment phase, we use of the secret node ids of any given pair of nodes to generate a bit pattern unique to both the the nodes. When the CHs find a common shared key during key establishment, they are to generate bit patterns of length same as that of the key length of the cryptosystem being used for communication. The bit patterns must have the following properties:
• Given a bit pattern, one should not be able to compute the bit pattern of any of the node identifiers from whom it is generated.
• Any two bit patterns (amongst
. That is no one should be able to guess one bit pattern by gaining information about another.
Next the CHs will securely send these bit pattern to concerned nodes during key establishment phase using the secure connectivity links. These bit patterns are meant to be padded or concatenated along with the corresponding key during message sending phase. Then a ``hash'' like function is to be applied to get a new set of communication keys having length same as the old cryptosystem key. One may use low cost hash function like Quark [10] for such purposes. These new keys must have the following properties:
• compute the new keys easily from combination of the existing communication keys and the bit pattern for any pair of nodes.
• infeasible to find any of the node ids that is used to generate a given bit pattern and hence form new keys.
• infeasible to find two different pairs of node ids generating same bit pattern and hence the new keys.
Emphasizing again, the node ids are unique to every node and the bit pattern is generated using the node ids of the two communicating nodes only. 
Storage Problem: Key Enumeration
To ensure minimum storage of such bit patterns while maximizing the security of the system, it is very important that all the keys of the network has some ordering. This enumeration plays a huge role in ensuring maximum distinction among the new keys when they get generated. Since the network is partitioned into small clusters we can label the CHs & nodes and deploy accordingly.
We are primarily interested in the penultimate tier having p CHs. We begin by labeling all of For any other key in the network, first make a list of all nodes sharing them. Now arrange the nodes in an ascending order according their index (explained in above subsection 7.1). Thus it is clear for every key, a maximum of p nodes are arranged in ascending order of their index. Now for the communication of ith and jth corresponding to a particular key, assign the bit pattern as that of ith and jth node of 1 k and not this key.
Distribution of Bit Patterns
Till now we have described a strategy how to distribute bit patterns among nodes sharing a single key. However in the current model any given pair of node shares 1 to 16 keys in common. We now describe how to use the bit patterns for two or more common keys between a pair of nodes. Our strategy generalizes quite easily. k , we are to use the bit pattern corresponding to ith and jth node of the key with which these patterns are generated ( 1 k ). On the contrary if t k is to be used then the bit pattern will correspond to ath & bth node of the chosen key ( 1 k ). The system decides upon the key to be used and hence automatically fixes up the bit patterns by above policy. These bit patterns can then be securely distributed among the sensors using the connectivity keys shared by each node with its CH.
Remark 1:
• Clearly for Design 2, the storage of bit pattern per node by the above described strategy will be ) (
. In fact it is pretty evident that if we want all distinct bit patterns per key, 2 p such are required. Thus the above described strategy will not work for Design 2.
• We can replace p by any prime power q in the above argument. This takes care of generalization to any finite field q F .
MESSAGE SENDING PROTOCOL
Suppose a message has to be sent from node N i;j to node N i';j' for some fixed 0 ≤ i, j, i', j'≤ p -1. Then the following protocol is to be executed.
Among existing common communication keys shared by nodes
The appropriate bit pattern is padded with ߤ and then hashed to get new communication key ߙ. ܰ encrypts the message with the key ߙ and not ߤ. if ܰ and ܰ share a connectivity key then
The message encrypted with com. key is again encrypted with the shared con. key and send directly to node ܰ . ܰ decrypts the outer encryption done using the con. key common to both the nodes. else node ܰ uses the con. key that it shares with its Cluster Head (CH) and send the doubly encrypted message to its CH. if node ܰ lies in the same cluster then After decrypting with ܰ , 's con. key and encrypting with ܰ ᇱ,ᇱ 's con. key, the common CH directly send it to node ܰ ᇲ ,ᇱ .
ܰ ᇱ,ᇱ decrypts outer encryption done using the con. key that it shares with the (common) CH giving message encrypted with ߙ. else
The doubly encrypted message from ܰ , is decrypted using ܰ , 's con. key at the CH of ܰ , . Re-encrypted the message encrypted with only ߙ at CH of ܰ using the con. key shared by CH of ܰ , .and CH of ܰ ᇱ,ᇱ Send this double encrypted message to CH of ܰ ᇱ,ᇱ . CH of ܰ then decrypts it with the con. key shared with CH of ܰ , .yielding message encrypted with ߙ. This message encrypted with ߙ is re-encrypted by CH of ܰ ᇱ,ᇱ using its shared con. key with ܰ ᇱ,ᇱ & send to ܰ ᇱ,ᇱ . ܰ will first decrypt the outer encryption done using the con. key shared with its own CH. Remark 2 briefs important aspects of the combined scheme needed for analysis of network parameters.
Remark 2:
• Alternatively when ܰ , & ܰ ᇱ,ᇱ have common connectivity key, they can use only this key for message exchange instead of double encryption. So in case the communicating pair of nodes share a common connectivity, either of them has to be captured to affect their communication. Thus we are assured of total security from cryptographic view point in this case.
• The node identifiers are to be transmitted only once when key establishment takes place. This phase is very fast and secure. In later stages, when massages are exchanged, the sender encrypts it before sending and only the recipient can decrypt it completely.
• At any stage the communication keys are not known to the CH. For affecting resiliency of the network, definitely nodes have to be captured. • Introduction of a secure connectivity model enables doubly encryption of the message while transmitting. The second encryption involves connectivity of the nodes & CHs.
• Nodes contain only the connectivity keys concerned to itself. Connectivity keys of all nodes in a cluster can only be found in CH of that particular cluster (not even in other CHs or KDS). This automatically implies to affect the communication of any node in the network, its CH must be captured.
• Though in practice capturing a CH is quite infeasible, while calculating the effect of the system on node capture, we make provision of capture of some CHs.
RESILIENCE
A hypothetical intrusion (i.e. attack) detection mechanism informs the KDS, CHs & subsequently the nodes about compromise of any node(s) as and when it occurs. For capture of a node 1 X , connectivity keys sacrificed are its broadcast key, keys between 1 X & remaining nodes in its cluster and the exclusive key shared by 1
Based on this information the concerned nodes and CH delete all the (above) connectivity keys ensuring that the captured node gets thoroughly delinked from the network. This deletion process has been elaborately described in [12, section V, subsection B] . In fact the beauty of this process is that after deletion of required connectivity links due to capture of some node(s), other nodes in that cluster remains connected in much the same way as they would without the compromised node(s).
Remark 3:
• It should be noted that at any stage the communication keys are not known to the CH. Thus for affecting the resiliency of the network, definitely some nodes have to be captured.
• Introduction of a secure connectivity model enables doubly encryption of message while transmitting. The second encryption involves connectivity of the nodes & CHs. Nodes contain only the con. keys concerned to itself. Connectivity keys of all nodes in a cluster can only be found in CH of that particular cluster (not even in other CHs or KDS). This automatically implies to affect the communication of any node in the network, its CH must be captured. Thus while calculating the effect of the system when some nodes are captured, we must ensure some CHs are also captured. In practice capturing a CH is quite infeasible.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Experimental results have been tabulated in Table 1 . N and k are as defined in section 2. In the table, ``Exp." stands for experimental, ``Thry." means theoretical results for current scheme. ``LS Exp'' is used as an abbreviation for Lee Stinson's experimental results as presented in [7] corresponding to `Design 1'. The tabulated values compares our results with [7] . 
CONCLUSION
A secure connectivity model has been utilized to make key establishment secure and then enhance message exchange of two pre-existing key predistribution schemes. Both the scheme were designed by Lee and Stinson in their works [7] and [8] . Both these scheme are based on
Transversal designs meant to support p and 2 p nodes respectively for a prime p . Significance of choosing a prime p is that the authors of [7] and [8] As has been elaborately explained in section 8, if these two nodes are in `radio frequency range' of each other (and share a connectivity key), doubly encrypted messages can be exchanged directly. In case they are not in each other's `radio frequency range' or don't have any common connectivity key, they are supposed to communicate through their CHs. However these CHs can not decrypt the encryption done with communication key shared by the nodes. To the best of our knowledge proposing a secure connectivity model, then using it for secure establish and later for enhancing the security during message exchange was first proposed by [12] .
Experimental results presented in section 10 exhibit the amount of improvement in resilience as compared the original key predistribution scheme proposed by Lee and Stinson. Though Sarkar et al. provided theoretical bounds of resiliency, experimental results were not mentioned. Other than this, they didn't indicate any particular deployment strategy. Thus how exactly the connectivity model was achieved in the target area was not clear. Section 5 has been devoted to address the deployment issue. From the discussion in section 5, it is clear that no physical movement of a node is required as long as there is some CH in its `radio frequency range' after deployment. Considering the hazards of deployment of nodes in a target area of WSN, this observation can be pretty useful to set up a network.
FUTURE WORK
Several future research directions stems out of our current work. The chosen key predistribution scheme does not guarantee direct node-to-node communication. Thus even though the connectivity is path connected graph, the resultant system does not have full connectivity.
The number of keys vary from 2 to 1 − r p . For better connectivity, we need the number of keys to be closer to r p . This number is rather high and prove dangerous when a node is captured. Thus we must seek a scheme having lesser keys per node with O(1) keys shared between any pair of nodes. Then one can apply the connectivity model in a suitable way to get promising results. Repeated enciphering and deciphering has been suggested at each CH in between two communicating nodes of different clusters. Certainly some communication cost will be reduced if one develops a system avoiding this. One such key predistribution scheme has suggested by Sarkar and Chowdhury in their recently published work [15] . Even in their scheme doesn't have constant number of key shared between a pair of nodes. In this regard, it may be fascinating to see applications of other Mathematical tools.
We are also faced with the challenging problem of distributing the bit patterns in the sensors under the space constraint restriction. More precisely, our aim is to store maximum possible distinct bit patterns within a space of order ) (q O . Combinatorial solution of this problem will be extremely fascinating.
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